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Abstract
Deep neural networks have been shown to be highly
vulnerable to adversarial examples—minor perturbations
added to a model’s input which cause the model to output an
incorrect prediction. This vulnerability represents both a risk
for the use of deep learning models in security-conscious
fields and an opportunity to improve our understanding of
how deep networks generalize to unexpected inputs. In a
transfer attack, the adversary builds an adversarial attack
using a surrogate model, then uses that attack to fool an un-
seen target model. Recent work in this subfield has focused
on attack generation methods which can improve transfer-
ability between models. We show that optimizing a single
surrogate model is a more effective method of improving
adversarial transfer, using the simple example of an under-
trained surrogate. This method transfers well across varied
architectures and outperforms state-of-the-art methods. To
interpret the effectiveness of undertrained surrogate models,
we represent adversarial transferability as a function of sur-
rogate model loss function curvature and similarity between
surrogate and target gradients and show that our approach
reduces the presence of local loss maxima which hinder
transferability. Our results suggest that finding good single
surrogate models is a highly effective and simple method for
generating transferable adversarial attacks, and that this
method represents a valuable route for future study in this
field.
1. Introduction
Previous work has shown that deep learning models are
vulnerable to adversarial perturbations [1]. These are small
modifications to an input image which cause the model to
output an incorrect prediction. The primary divide is be-
tween white box and black-box attacks. In white box attacks,
the attacker has access to the parameters and architecture of
the target model, allowing them to utilize model gradients
and losses. In black-box attacks, the adversary has no access
to the parameters of the target model, and may or may not
have access to its architecture or use of the target as an ora-
cle model (which allows the adversary to submit inputs and
receive model predictions on those inputs).
Understanding adversarial examples is an important task.
When deep models are applied in security-conscious do-
mains such as autonomous driving, healthcare, and fraud
detection, their vulnerabilities to attack become vulnerabil-
ities which can threaten individual health and safety. This
takes on special importance with the advent of work showing
that adversarial examples can be engineered to fool models
in the physical world [2, 3]. Understanding adversarial ex-
amples may suggest methods for producing defenses against
them. Currently the most consistently successful method
for defending models is adversarial training, which entails
training on adversarial examples in addition to (or instead of)
clean images [4]. Robust adversarial training methods are
computationally expensive, reduce model accuracy on clean
inputs, and only provide limited security, suggesting that
better methods are needed [4, 5]. Adversarial examples can
also be used to stop malicious neural networks. [6] shows
that adversarial examples can cause generative adversarial
networks to output unrealistic images, a potential defense
against deepfake-style malicious image translation.
2. Adversarial transfer
Szegedy et al. showed that adversarial examples also have
the ability to transfer between models, allowing an example
generated on one model to fool a different model [1]. This
effect means that keeping a model’s parameters and query
access private is not an effective way to protect a model from
adversarial attack. As long as an adversary has the ability
to train a model on a compatible dataset, the adversary can
use their own model as a surrogate to produce adversarial
examples which may then fool the target classifier.
Many methods for producing effective black-box transfer
rely on access to the outputs of the target model [7]. Ac-
cess to target model outputs allows for a class of attacks
known as gradient estimation attacks, in which the adver-
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sary attempts to estimate the gradients of the target model in
order to approximate a white-box attack in a black-box set-
ting. Required access to the target model can range from the
predicted label for an input to class-conditional probability
predictions for all classes. Recent approaches to gradient-
estimation attacks include [8],[9], [10], and [11]. Other
approaches such as Moon et al. [12] use query access to
construct adversarial examples without gradient estimation.
This approach is not always representative of real-world
model access. In real-world settings, models may be secured
by restricting access to outputs or limiting the permitted
number of queries. In these settings, an adversary may not
have access to the predictions for any inputs. This led Ilyas
et al. to introduce more restrictive black-box settings in [13].
We use the restrictive zero-knowledge, zero-access set-
ting, in which an adversary has no knowledge of model
architecture or parameters, and has no access to model out-
puts. An adversary which can effectively fool a target model
in this setting is extremely strong. One approach in this
setting focuses on building attacks on ensembles of surro-
gate classifiers [14]. This approach reduces the overfit of
attacks to the surrogate model, and increases their ability to
transfer to the target model. A limitation of this approach
is the computational requirements for an adversary to train
multiple diverse classifiers and build adversarial examples
using them in parallel.
Recent attempts to produce more successful transfer at-
tacks have focused on creating stronger attack generation
methods. The current state of the art in query-free adversar-
ial transfer is the Intermediate Level Attack (ILA) introduced
by Huang et al. [15]. They show that enhancing a previously
generated adversarial example by increasing its perturba-
tion on a certain layer of the surrogate model substantially
improves transfer to target models.
Our work, by contrast, focuses on finding a more effective
individual surrogate model. We show that generating sim-
ple attacks on a more effective surrogate produces stronger
transferability than generating more sophisticated attacks
on a less effective surrogate. We suggest that further re-
search into finding highly effective surrogate models may be
a promising avenue for producing strong transfer attacks and
accurately assessing the true robustness of existing models
to black-box attack.
3. Methodology
3.1. Models & training
We chose to evaluate our approaches across a wide va-
riety of model architectures to produce an accurate assess-
ment of transfer between both similar and different mod-
els. We report results using ResNet18 models, SENet18
models, GoogLeNet models, DenseNet121 models, and
MobileNetV2 models as described by [16, 17, 18, 19, 20].
Model architectures are as they is defined in their original
papers, with minor changes given by [21] to accommodate
the input size of CIFAR-10 images. All models are trained
and evaluated on an individual NVIDIA Tesla P100 GPU.
We use the CIFAR-10 dataset for training and testing [22].
This dataset is composed of 60,000 images divided into ten
disjoint classes. There are 6,000 images per class, and the
dataset is divided into 50,000 training images and 10,000
test images. Each image is a full color 3× 32× 32 image.
For naturally trained models, we used the definitions and
training scripts provided by [21] and trained the models for
90 epochs. We used a stepped learning rate schedule with
an initial learning rate of 0.1, decreased by a factor of 10
at epochs 30 and 60. We achieve final accuracy of 94.29%
for the ResNet18 model, 94.44% for the SENet18 model,
94.43% for the GoogLeNet model, 92.23% for the Mo-
bileNetV2 model, and 94.99% for the DenseNet121 model.
Our trained accuracies are comparable to those reported by
[21].
To ensure that our analysis is comparable to the current
state of the art, we use the pretrained target models released
by [15]. These models are a ResNet18 model, an SENet18
model, a DenseNet121 model, and a GoogLeNet model as
described by [16, 17, 19, 18]. As with our surrogate models,
these models are as defined by their original authors with the
exception of minor modifications to support the 32×32 input
size of CIFAR-10 images. These models are implemented
and trained using code released by [21], consistent with our
training. The authors train their models for 350 total epochs,
using a learning rate schedule which starts at 0.1 and reduces
by a factor of 10 at epochs 150 and 250. The ResNet model
is trained to 94.76% accuracy on the CIFAR-10 validation
set, the SENet model is trained to 94.58% accuracy, and
the GoogLeNet model is trained to 94.85% accuracy. To
introduce a more distinct model architecture, we also train a
MobileNetV2 model for 350 epochs using the same learning
rate schedule. This model achieves final test set accuracy of
94.06%.
For adversarially trained models, we use fast adversarial
training, introduced by [23], with  = .05 to train ResNet18
models via adversarial training. Fast adversarial training
introduces FGSM adversarial examples with random initial-
izations into each minibatch while training, controlling for a
phenomenon the authors refer to as catastrophic overfitting
to produce robustness to iterative attack. Following the pa-
rameters introduced by [23], we train robust models for 45
epochs using cyclic learning rates. Our first model achieves
clean test accuracy of 79.66%, and our second achieves test
accuracy of 79.58%. The first model achieves white box ad-
versarial accuracy of 41.03% against a 20-iteration I-FGSM
attack, and the second gets 40.98% accuracy. These results
are comparable to those reported by [23], and show that the
adversarial training method makes these models quite robust
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to adversarial examples.
3.2. Attacks
We evaluate our models against a variety of attacks, and
show them below. Our results are based on standard imple-
mentations of the attacks released by Huang et al. and the
Cleverhans team [15, 24].  = .05 for all attacks.
The Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) was intro-
duced by Goodfellow et al. as a simple method for pro-
ducing adversarial examples efficiently [4]. The adversarial
perturbation is generated by scaling the sign of the model’s
gradient by , and this perturbation is added to the original
image to form the adversarial example. The adversarial im-
age, xˆ, is defined by 1, where ∇`(x) is the gradient of the
model loss with respect to input x.
xˆ = x+  · sign(∇`(x)) (1)
Iterative FGSM (I-FGSM), also referred to as the Basic
Iterative Method, is a simple extension to the FGSM attack,
introduced by [2]. This method applies FGSM repeatedly
to produce a more finely targeted adversarial example. The
attack is defined in Equation 2, where xˆn indicates the ad-
versarial example produced by n steps of I-FGSM and α
indicates the learning rate. Here the function Clip restricts
the adversarial example to remain within the -ball surround-
ing x.
xˆn = Clipx,( ˆxn−1 + α · sign(∇`(xn−1))) (2)
We use a learning rate (the epsilon value during each itera-
tion) of .005 and 20 iterations. These values were determined
empirically via grid search to produce the strongest transfer.
Momentum I-FGSM (MI-FGSM) was introduced by
Dong et al. [25] to enhance iterative attack transferability.
The authors find that incorporating a momentum term in
when calculating I-FGSM increases the stability of the attack
by reducing its susceptibility to being trapped in a local loss
maximum. We use a learning rate of .005 and 20 iterations
of attack, with a decay µ = 0.9.
The Transferable Adversarial Perturbation (TAP) at-
tack, introduced by Zhou et al., uses intermediate feature
representations to generate an adversarial example [26]. The
TAP attack attempts to maximize the distance between the
original image and the adversarial image in the intermedi-
ate feature maps of the surrogate model. The authors also
show that applying smooth regularization to the resulting
perturbation improves transfer between models.
The Intermediate Level Attack (ILA) was introduced
by Huang et al. in 2019 as the state of the art in query-free
transfer attacks [15]. This method takes a predefined adver-
sarial example, created using another method, and enhances
its perturbation on intermediate layer representations in the
surrogate model. The attack uses the predefined example as
a guide towards an adversarial direction. We refer to an ILA
attack which enhances an example produced by FGSM as
ILA-enhanced FGSM, and follow the same convention for
other ILA attacks. For ILA-enhanced iterative attacks, we
follow the methodology of the original paper and use ten iter-
ations of the original attack followed by ten iterations of ILA
enhancement. For each surrogate, we evaluated ILA attacks
based on each possible layer, and found that the optimal
source layer to enhance perturbations on was consistent for
all epochs of the surrogate model. We find that the optimal
layer to target is block 4 for ResNet18 and SENet18, block
0 for MobileNetV2, block 9 for GoogLeNet, and block 6 for
DenseNet121, and we report results for ILA based on these
layers. These parameters are consistent with the optimal
target layers shown by Huang et al. [15].
4. Intermediate epoch transferability
Prior work has often focused on attack generation strate-
gies which improve transferability. These include algorith-
mic approaches such as MI-FGSM, which introduced a mo-
mentum term to prevent the attack from being caught in local
loss maxima, and vr-IGSM, which introduced local gradient
smoothing for the same reason [25, 27]. They also include
novel approaches such as input diversity, in which the at-
tacker transforms the adversarial image during the attack to
find a more generalizable perturbation [28].
We instead focus on finding a surrogate model with a
generalizable yet low complexity decision boundary. The
surrogate model must be generalizable to approximate the
decision boundary of the data manifold well (and thus ap-
proximate the decision boundary of the target model well). It
must also be low complexity, to limit the effect of local loss
maxima on the generated attack. If we avoid the surrogate
model overfitting to the training data, we can in turn ensure
that it learns a highly generalizable, low-complexity function.
Learning this type of function maximizes our chance of an
attack on the surrogate model generalizing well to the target
model, as shown by [29]. These observations give rise to a
simple method for minimizing overfit to the training data:
undertraining the surrogate model.
We define an undertrained surrogate model as the condi-
tion of the model at an earlier epoch of training with a lower
validation set accuracy than the final, fully trained model
(ie, the model at the point which has the highest validation
set accuracy). We require both conditions, as an epoch with
lower validation set accuracy that comes after the epoch with
the best accuracy is likely to be overtrained rather than under-
trained, and by definition of the fully trained epoch no other
epoch can have a higher validation set accuracy. To evaluate
this approach, we train surrogate models fully as described
in Section 3.1 and save a copy of the model parameters after
each epoch of training. This enables retroactive evaluation
of the optimal point for building an adversarial attack. We
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Figure 2: ResNet18 post-attack accuracy on I-FGSM.
show an overview of our transfer evaluation methodology in
Figure 1.
5. Results
5.1. Naturally trained transfer
To evaluate the effectiveness of this approach, we tested
transfer between two separately trained ResNet18 models
across epochs. Both models were trained using the surrogate
model training procedure described in 3.1. We evaluated
transfer by generating attacks on every third epoch of the
first model (ie, the epoch set {1, 4, 7, ..., 88}) and trans-
ferred them to the all epochs in the same set of the second
model. Our results are shown in Figure 2, where lower accu-
racy after attack indicates more effective transfer. Although
intuition would suggest that attacks generated on a given
surrogate epoch would transfer best to the same epoch of
target model, our results show that this is not the case. The
resulting accuracy landscape instead shows a distinct valley
between surrogate epochs 20 and 40, where the same surro-
gate models transfer well to almost all target model epochs.
Also significant is that these epochs outperform later epochs
(those which are more fully trained) in transferring to target
models. These results validate the hypothesis that under-
training can produce a surrogate model which generates
significantly more transferable adversarial examples.
We expand our analysis by evaluating transfer from in-
termediate epochs of ResNet18, SENet18, MobileNetV2,
GoogLeNet, and DenseNet121 models to separately trained
target models from the same set of architectures. We consider
this wide variety of architectures to evaluate the effective-
ness of our approach in a true black-box setting, where the
target model architecture is unknown and thus no guarantees
can be made about the similarity of the target and surrogate
model architectures. Note that the separate training means
that attacks between the same architectures are not strictly
white box attacks, as the models have different parameters.
We generate attacks on every other epoch of the surrogate
model, and target the epoch of the target model with the low-
est test loss (ie, the fully trained final model). We evaluate
transfer for a variety of attacks: FGSM, I-FGSM, MI-FGSM,
ILA-enhanced FGSM, ILA-enhanced I-FGSM, and Trans-
ferable Adversarial Perturbations. For all attacks, we use
the parameters outlined in Section 3.2, and use the attack
method to form adversarial examples based on all 10,000
images in the CIFAR-10 validation set.
We compare our approach of generating adversarial ex-
amples on intermediate epochs to the previous standard ap-
proach of generating adversarial examples on the best loss
model. Our findings suggest that the intermediate-epoch
approach produces examples which transfer substantially
more successfully than previous approaches across a variety
of attack styles. For all attacks evaluated, the intermediate
epoch attack outperforms the best epoch attack. Our results
for the best intermediate epoch compared to the previous
approach using a ResNet18 surrogate model are given in
Table 1, and we show results for all surrogate models for
MI-FGSM attacks in Figure 3. We provide equivalent graphs
for all other attacks in the supplementary material (SM) in
Figures S1-S5.
We show that an intermediate epoch MI-FGSM attack
produces the strongest results across most surrogate-target
combinations, with the exception of the ResNet18 surrogate.
We discuss potential reasons for I-FGSM performing sim-
ilarly to MI-FGSM on the ResNet18 surrogate in 6. We
selected the strongest surrogate (ResNet18) by choosing the
surrogate which produced attacks which performed the best
on average across all target models. We choose to focus
on the MI-FGSM attack, since it performs the best across
the full range of surrogate models. MI-FGSM attacks based
on the ResNet18 surrogate reduced accuracy on ResNet18
by 97.65%, on GoogLeNet by 94.07%, on MobileNetV2
by 97.02%, on SENet18 by 97.64%, and on DenseNet121
by 97.66%. These results emphasize the ability of interme-
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Table 1: Accuracy (%) (show as Undertrained/Fully Trained) after attack by target model for attacks generated using an
intermediate surrogate epoch of a ResNet18 model and the surrogate epoch with the lowest validation loss.  = .05. Lower
accuracy indicates better transfer.
Target MI-FGSM I-FGSM ILA MI-FGSM ILA I-FGSM TAP
ResNet18 2.23/15.63 2.20/22.40 2.41/10.39 2.36/9.98 13.44/22.83
SENet18 2.23/16.00 2.79/24.43 2.69/10.87 2.88/11.57 12.92/22.36
MobileNetV2 2.74/18.76 2.79/22.36 2.82/11.99 2.62/10.24 12.76/22.93
GoogLeNet 5.62/26.64 5.61/35.42 6.35/17.09 6.04/16.76 17.18/27.96
DenseNet121 2.24/15.87 2.13/21.60 2.57/10.29 2.44/9.42 13.67/21.74
diate attacks to generalize across a wide variety of target
model architectures in a black-box setting. To the best of
our knowledge, this makes an intermediate epoch MI-FGSM
attack (IMI-FGSM) the state of the art in query-free transfer
attacks. Our results also show that the optimal surrogate
epoch for transfer is consistent across target models for all
attacks except TAP. This indicates that an adversary can se-
lect the strongest surrogate by evaluating performance on
other models, without requiring any query access to the tar-
get model, fitting our case of the black-box setting with zero
query access.
To address the possibility that our final epoch models
are overtrained, and do not represent typical models, we
also perform attacks between our target models (i.e., we
use each target model as a surrogate, and evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of attacks generated on the target model when
transfering to other target models). All models except for
the MobileNetV2 architecture were released as pretrained
models by Huang et al. [15], who used these models as their
target and surrogate models. All including the MobileNetV2
architecture were trained using a open-sourced training code
and hyperparameters provided by [21]. When evaluated as
surrogates, these models perform very similarly to the best
loss epochs of our separately trained surrogate models, and
our undertrained models outperform them. We report the
results of this analysis in Table 2. This indicates that our
best loss models are representative of typical models trained
on the CIFAR-10 dataset.
These results show that undertraining a surrogate model
is a highly effective strategy for producing adversarial exam-
ples which can transfer well across varied model architec-
tures.
5.2. Adversarially trained transfer
We next investigated the impact of adversarial training on
this phenomenon, providing results for transferred attacks
between two ResNet18 models adversarially trained using
the Fast-FGSM method introduced by [23], as discussed
in Section 3.2. Some prior work has been done here by
Vivek et al., who showed intermediate-epoch adversarial effi-
cacy for non-robust adversarially trained models trained with
FGSM examples (discussed there in the context of reducing
the cost of ensemble adversarial training) [30]. Our results
show that intermediate epoch transferability is restricted to
non-robust models such as naturally trained or non-robust
FGSM trained models. We report full results on adversarially
trained models in Figure 4. Our results also call into question
the conclusion of Vivek et. al that this effect is caused by
adversarial training producing models which generate weak
adversaries, since we find that this effect is not present in
robust models.
6. Explaining surrogate-based transferability
Here we evaluate potential causes of improved transfer-
ability for certain surrogates, and build an explanatory model
for transferability.
Gradient similarity is an important factor in transfer-
ability. Models which produce similar gradients on input
images will produce similar adversarial images when using
gradient-based attacks. We suggest that by undertraining the
surrogate classifier, we retain more universal characteristics
in the gradient, ensuring that the surrogate model gradients
will be similar to any target classifier which learns the data
manifold regardless of architecture and training method. To
evaluate this effect, we calculated the cosine similarity gra-
dients for surrogate and target models on clean images. To
do so, we calculate gradients on test set images for surrogate
and target models. We then reshape each image gradient into
a vector, and take the l2 normalized dot product of the target
and surrogate model gradients, averaging this value across
all images. Here xis represents the reshaped gradient of im-
age i with respect to surrogate model loss and xit represents
the same quantity with respect to target model loss:
Similarity =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
xisx
i
t
|xis|2|xit|2
). (3)
We show results for all surrogate and target models in
Figure 3. For all surrogate-target pairs evaluated, gradient
similarity is negatively correlated to the post-attack accuracy
with p < .001. We report correlations in SM in Table S1.
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Table 2: Accuracy (%) after attack by given target model (column) for attacks generated using each of the other target models.
We omit the diagonal, since the diagonal is a white box attack.  = .05. Lower accuracy indicates better transfer.
Attack Source Target
ResNet18 SENet18 MobileNetV2 GoogLeNet DenseNet121
MI-FGSM ResNet18 — 17.90 21.87 29.06 19.64
SENet18 12.28 — 16.37 20.10 12.87
MobileNetV2 17.64 18.31 — 21.89 16.78
GoogLeNet 26.80 18.31 27.87 — 22.93
DenseNet121 11.42 10.78 12.13 12.67 —
I-FGSM ResNet18 — 27.35 31.45 42.81 29.34
SENet18 16.06 — 21.00 25.88 17.26
MobileNetV2 23.41 24.60 — 28.33 22.07
GoogLeNet 36.90 35.61 36.73 — 31.29
DenseNet121 21.65 20.72 21.95 24.10 —
ILA MI-FGSM ResNet18 — 7.95 9.60 12.96 8.41
SENet18 7.07 — 8.56 11.29 7.36
MobileNetV2 27.24 29.00 — 33.45 26.60
GoogLeNet 11.47 11.56 12.19 — 8.56
DenseNet121 6.91 6.59 7.01 7.87 —
ILA I-FGSM ResNet18 — 7.67 9.35 13.86 7.74
SENet18 6.66 — 8.14 10.98 6.88
MobileNetV2 28.04 29.66 — 34.17 26.94
GoogLeNet 12.52 12.14 13.05 — 9.05
DenseNet121 6.43 6.16 6.73 7.62 —
TAP ResNet18 — 20.66 21.55 25.70 20.72
SENet18 15.14 — 18.37 21.58 15.81
MobileNetV2 28.92 29.64 — 34.65 27.42
GoogLeNet 17.79 17.82 17.10 — 15.37
DenseNet121 20.37 19.49 20.15 20.46 —
(d) SENet18 surrogate model (e) DenseNet121 surrogate model(c) MobileNetV2 surrogate model
(b) ResNet18 surrogate model(a) GoogLeNet surrogate model
Figure 3: Solid lines indicates post-attack accuracy for MI-FGSM transfer attacks from naturally trained models to target
models ( = .05). Lower accuracy indicates better transfer. Dashed colored lines indicate gradient similarity between surrogate
and target at each epoch. The black vertical lines indicate the surrogate epoch with the best transferability for most attacks.
However, the results shown in Figure 3 raise several ques-
tions which suggest that gradient correlation is not a perfect
proxy for transferability. Note that while the similarity plots
for all surrogate/target models exhibit sharp spikes in gradi-
ent similarity after epoch 30, which matches transferability
improving at that epoch, in many cases gradient similarity
does not decline appreciably after the epochs of maximal
transferability. Relying on solely gradient direction similar-
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Figure 4: Accuracy of an adversarially trained ResNet18 model against transferred I-FGSM examples from a second
adversarially trained ResNet18 model by epoch of the surrogate model, broken out by type of adversarial training. Lower
accuracy indicates better transfer.
ity, we might expect that later epochs would transfer better
for some models. These results confirm those of Liu et al. in
showing that while gradient similarity between a surrogate
and target model is linked with adversarial transferability,
other factors appear to be at play [14].
Loss function curvature represents the second part of
our explanatory model. Our secondary goal in undertrain-
ing is to reduce decision boundary complexity, limiting the
effect of local loss maxima on the surrogate model. While
decision boundary complexity is computationally challeng-
ing to directly quantify, the topology of the decision of a
network is closely related to its loss landscape, which we can
measure locally [31]. Some prior work has also suggested
that local loss function smoothness is related to adversarial
transferability, and it also appears to be highly related with
adversarial robustness [27, 32]. We evaluate the hypothesis
that intermediate epochs have lower complexity than fully
trained models. We follow Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [32] in
using a finite difference approximation of local loss curva-
ture for a random subset of the test data and take the average
magnitude of the result for each epoch. Our results show
a local minimum in local loss curvature at the optimal in-
termediate epoch for all models except MobileNetV2. For
all models considered, the optimal intermediate epoch cur-
vature is significantly lower than the final model curvature.
Figure 5 shows the local loss curvature by epoch for all
surrogate models.
To confirm that the reduced curvature is accurately re-
flecting a reduction in local loss maxima, we note that the
improved performance of MI-FGSM over I-FGSM is based
on the ability of MI-FGSM to escape local loss maxima. We
thus expect that MI-FGSM will outperform I-FGSM more
on models with more local loss maxima (ie, models with a
Figure 5: Loss curvature approximation for all surrogate
models.
more complex loss landscape). This suggests that if higher
curvature indeed implies more local loss maxima and a more
complex loss landscape, it will have strong positive correla-
tion with how much MI-FGSM outperforms I-FGSM. We
calculate the Pearson correlation coefficient between cur-
vature and how strongly MI-FGSM outperformed I-FGSM
(ie, the accuracy of target models on MI-FGSM examples
minus their accuracy on I-FGSM examples) for each surro-
gate model. We found highly statistically significant positive
correlation between curvature and how strongly MI-FGSM
outperformed I-FGSM (mean coefficient = 0.86, p < .001
for all surrogate models). This indicates that our approach is
successfully producing a surrogate model with a less com-
plex loss landscape.
These results also suggest a potential explanation for why
the ResNet18 surrogate model outperforms other models in
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Table 3: Linear model of post-attack accuracy for all target
models (R2 = 0.681)Table 2: Linear Model of Post-Attack Accuracy (R2 = 0.681)
Variable Coefficient P-Value
Loss Curvature Magnitude 4.25 p < .001
Gradient Similarity -37.10 p < .001
Gradient Similarity Squared 28.76 p < .001
DenseNet121 Source 19.99 p < .001
GoogLeNet Source 17.50 p < .001
MobileNetV2 Source 13.95 p < .001
ResNet18 Source 27.49 p < .001
SENet18 Source 15.58 p < .001
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local loss maxima on the surrogate model. While decision boundary complexity is computationally285
challenging to directly quantify, the topology of the decision of a network is closely related to its286
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that if higher curvature indeed implies more local loss maxima and a more complex loss landscape, it299
will have strong positive correlation with how much MI-FGSM outperforms I-FGSM. We calculate300
the Pearson correlation coefficient between curvature and how strongly MI-FGSM outperformed301
I-FGSM (ie, the accuracy of target models on MI-FGSM examples minus their accuracy on I-FGSM302
examples) for each surrogate model. We found highly statistically significant positive correlation303
between curvature and how strongly MI-FGSM outperformed I-FGSM (mean coefficient = 0.86,304
p < .001 for all surrogate models). This indicates that our approach is successfully producing a305
surrogate model with a less complex loss landscape.306
These results also suggest a potential explanation for why the ResNet18 surrogate model outperforms307
other models in intermediate transfer; despite the relatively high parameter count, its complexity at all308
epochs is significantly lower than that of the other models we consider. This result may also explain309
why ResNet18 is the only surrogate model architecture in which an intermediate I-FGSM attack310
performs as well or better than the MI-FGSM attack: the lower complexity of the ResNet18 model311
loss landscape reduces the impact of local loss maxima, removing the advantage of the MI-FGSM.312
6.3 Modeling313
To evaluate the impact of gradient similarity and curvature, we build an ordinary least squares linear314
regression model to predict post-attack accuracy. The model includes gradient similarity, squared315
gradient similarity, curvature, and a constant for each source model. We report coefficients and316
significance measures in Table 2. Our model produces an R2 value of 0.681, which further confirms317
our hypothesis that gradient similarity and curvature are highly significant predictors of transferability.318
7 Discussion319
We find that adversarial examples generated on320
an undertrained surrogate model transfer signifi-321
cantly more successfully than attacks generated322
on fully trained models. Our MI-FGSM attacks323
generated on undertrained models outperform the current state of the art in query-free black-box324
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intermediate transfer; despite the relatively high parameter
count, its complexity at all epochs is significantly lower than
that of the other models we consider. This result may also ex-
plain why ResNet18 is the only surrogate model architecture
in which an intermediate I-FGSM attack performs as well or
better than the MI-FGSM attack: the lower complexity of the
ResNet18 model loss landscape reduces the impact of local
loss maxima, removing the advantage of the MI-FGSM.
6.1. Explanatory Model
To evaluate the impact of gradient similarity and curva-
ture, we train an ordinary least squares linear regression
model to predict po t- ttack accuracy. The model includes
gradient similarity, squared gradient similarity, curvature,
and a constant for each source model as the independent
variables. We include squared gradient similarity due to the
presence of nonlinear residuals in a model without squared
gradient similarity. We report coefficients and significance
measures in Table 3. Our model confirms that gradient
similarity and curvature are highly significant (p < .001)
predictors of transferability.
7. Discussion
We find that adversarial examples generated on an under-
trained surrogate model transfer significantly more success-
fully than attacks generated on fully trained models. Our
MI-FGSM attacks generated on undertrained models out-
perform the current state of the art in query-free black-box
transfer. Our results suggest that a new focus on finding
strong single surrogate models could produce stronger re-
sults for adversarial transfer. We ex lain inter ediate epoch
transferability as the result of two effects: high gradient simi-
larity and low loss function curvature. We show that gradient
similarity and loss function curvature are highly significant
(p < .001) predictors of transferability.
We also note that this result has important implications
for the analysi of model robustness to black-box attack.
Prior work has assumed that surrogate models trained with
the same architecture and training procedure are the worst-
case for adversarial transfer [5]. However, our results show
that this is not the worst-case. An undertrained surrogate
model—even one with a different architecture—can produce
attacks which transfer more successfully than those based
on fully trained models of the same architecture. This sug-
gests that prior robustness analyses underestimate the risk
of black-box transfer attacks. Our work also finds that this
effect is not present in robust models, though it is present
to some degree in non-robust adversarially trained models,
confirming the results given by Vivek et al. [30]. Further
work here may provide insights into how the training process
of robust models differs from that of non-robust models.
8. Conclusion and Future Work
Our results show that a simple approach focused on surro-
gate model, rather than attack method, outperforms standard
methods for producing transferable adversarial attacks. We
show that this surrogate-focused approach to adversarial ex-
ample generation creates attacks which transfer well across
architectures and models while requiring no query access to
the target model. The undertrained surrogate attack outper-
forms the prior state-of-th -art, ILA-enhanced MI-FGSM,
by seven to ten percentage points, reducing target classifier
performance to below random chance accuracy. Our findings
indicate a gap in existing understanding of both adversar-
ial transferability and intermediate epoch models, and note
that surrogate models represents an open area of investiga-
tion for improvements in transfer attacks. Our findings also
reveal that the previous known worst-case scenario for black-
box transfer (a surrogate model with the same architecture
and training pr cedure) is not an accurate representation
of the worst-case, and produces misleading estimates of
model robustness to black-box transfer attacks. Evaluation
of strategies for producing strong surrogates may provide
more in ight into the mechanics of transferability and the
strength of black-box attacks.
Our findings leave open many avenues for future work.
First among these is how other choices of surrogate model
architecture, regularization, and hyperparameters can im-
pact adversarial transferability. Of the surrogate models we
evaluate, ResNet18 produces the strongest transfer to the
chosen target models. We suggest in Section 6 that this is
due to the mod l’s low complexity compared to the other
models evaluated. However, it is likely that a more effec-
tive surrogate architecture or training method exists. Work
on this front would help to identify architectural attributes
which produce more universal gradient characteristics and
reduce loss curvature. Finally, we suggest that extension of
this analys s to different tasks m y provide context for how
widespread this effect is.
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Supplementary Material
Table S1: Pearson correlation coefficients between gradient similarity and post-attack accuracy for all epochs of each
surrogate/target pair. * indicates p < .05, ** indicates p < .01, and *** indicates p < .001.
Source Target
ResNet18 SENet18 MobileNetV2 GoogLeNet DenseNet121
ResNet18 -0.58*** -0.57*** -0.75*** -0.76*** -0.84***
SENet18 -0.68*** -0.63*** -0.70*** -0.69*** -0.76***
MobileNetV2 -0.95*** -0.96*** -0.97*** -0.99*** -0.97***
GoogLeNet -0.64*** -0.63*** -0.60*** -0.70*** -0.55***
DenseNet121 -0.58*** -0.60*** -0.78*** -0.53*** -0.59***
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(a) GoogLeNet surrogate model
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(e) DenseNet121 surrogate model
Figure S1: Post-attack accuracy for ILA enhanced MI-FGSM transfer attacks from naturally trained models to target models,
( = .05). Lower accuracy indicates better transfer. The dashed lines indicate the surrogate epoch with the best transferability
for most attacks.
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(e) DenseNet121 surrogate model
Figure S2: Post-attack accuracy for ILA enhanced I-FGSM transfer attacks from naturally trained models to target models,
( = .05). Lower accuracy indicates better transfer. The dashed lines indicate the surrogate epoch with the best transferability
for most attacks.
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(e) DenseNet121 surrogate model
Figure S3: Post-attack accuracy for I-FGSM transfer attacks from naturally trained models to target models, ( = .05). Lower
accuracy indicates better transfer. The dashed lines indicate the surrogate epoch with the best transferability for most attacks.
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(e) DenseNet121 surrogate model
Figure S4: Post-attack accuracy for FGSM transfer attacks from naturally trained models to target models, ( = .05). Lower
accuracy indicates better transfer. The dashed lines indicate the surrogate epoch with the best transferability for most attacks.
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(e) DenseNet121 surrogate model
Figure S5: Post-attack accuracy for TAP transfer attacks from naturally trained models to target models, ( = .05). Lower
accuracy indicates better transfer. The dashed lines indicate the surrogate epoch with the best transferability for most attacks.
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